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The Political Consequences of Supreme Court 
Consensus: 
Media Coverage, Public Opinion, and Unanimity as a 
Public-Facing Strategy 
Michael A. Zilis* 
The Roberts Court has an affinity for consensus. In recent years, 
many, including Chief Justice Roberts himself, have remarked on the 
Court’s desire to reach unanimous decisions. According to Roberts, 
“the more cautious approach, the approach that can get the most 
justices to sign onto it, is the preferred approach.”1 Boasting that one 
term “had more unanimous opinions announced in a row than ever 
before,” Roberts has described a deliberate strategy to build 
consensus, in which agreement among the Justices in relatively minor 
disputes lays the foundation for consensus in more important 
controversies.2 By 2014, media outlets were touting the Court’s 
“remarkable achievement” of reaching unanimous decisions in more 
than two-thirds of its rulings, a feat that it had not accomplished for 
seventy years.3 
 
 * Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky. 
   1  Mark Sherman, Roberts Touts Unanimity on the Supreme Court, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2006), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/17/AR2006111700999.html. 
 2 Jeffrey Rosen, Robert’s Rules, ATLANTIC, (Feb. 2007), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-
rules/305559/. 
  3   Neal K. Katyal, The Supreme Court’s Powerful New Consensus, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
Document7  12/17/17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 54:229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why is consensus so important to the current Justices? Roberts 
has suggested that unanimity contributes to “stability in the law,” 
which may increase the durability of precedent as well as compliance 
from lower courts.4 Unanimity also has potential political benefits at 
a time in which satisfaction with the judiciary has been declining.5 
And unanimity may increase favorable media coverage, popular 
support, and acceptance of rulings.6 Still, the mechanisms by which 
consensus translates into support remain understudied. This Article 
seeks to answer two related questions. First, is the public more likely 
to accept unanimous decisions? Second, by what process does 
judicial consensus translate into public support?   
I think of consensus as a signal that has consequences for how the 
media and the public respond to rulings. I argue that high levels of 
support for rulings decided by large majority coalitions arise from the 
more favorable treatment the press gives these decisions. Because 
 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/opinion/the-
supreme-courts-powerful-new-consensus.html. 
4 Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History 
Analysis of  
Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. 
POL. 534–50 (2002); see also Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The 
Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 10 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., no. 2325–58 (2013); but see generally Chad 
Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 54 AM J. POL. SCI. 891 (2010). 
5 James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Change in Institutional Support 
for the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court’s Legitimacy Imperiled by the 
Decisions It Makes?, 80 PUB. OPINION Q. 622–41 (2016). 
6 See generally Vanessa A. Baird & Amy Gangl, Shattering the Myth of 
Legality: The Impact of the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures 
on Perceptions of Fairness, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 597–614 (2006); see also 
James R. Zink et al., Courting the Public: The Influence of Decision 
Attributes on Individuals’ Views of Court Opinions, 71 J. POL. 909–25 
(2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/21
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most citizens do not read judicial opinions and only sporadically pay 
attention to the Court, they are unlikely to have noticed the recent 
push for consensus.7  Yet consensus allows the judiciary to 
effectively legitimate decisions by increasing favorable media 
coverage of them. This is important because most citizens learn about 
Court decisions through the press. I theorize that the press uses voting 
signals from the Court when shaping coverage of rulings. The press is 
more likely to frame non-unanimous decisions in unfavorable terms 
than otherwise similar unanimous ones. This difference in coverage 
in turn informs public opinion about high profile rulings. The Court 
can foster support for its rulings by signaling its consensus to the 
press, which then offers favorable coverage that can increase popular 
approval of the Court’s actions.  
I develop this argument in four parts. I begin with the three ways 
that unanimity can foster popular support: by serving as a high 
credibility cue sent directly from the Court to the public; limiting 
public exposure to competing perspectives (i.e., dissenting opinions) 
that can undercut the majority’s reasoning in a given case; and most 
important of all, shaping the public’s understanding of decisions as 
filtered through the media. I suggest that consensus can increase 
support for rulings through a process in which the Court signals to the 
press a lack of disagreement over a ruling, the press produces 
favorable or even one-sided coverage of the decision, and the public, 
consuming this information, becomes more supportive. In part two, I 
review empirical evidence that voting outcomes function as a key 
signal to the press, which, in turn, influences its coverage of rulings. 
More specifically, I show that unanimous decisions receive more 
positive and deferential coverage than any other type of ruling. Then, 
I connect these findings to research on public opinion and the Court. I 
demonstrate that positive coverage of rulings increases popular 
support for the policies adopted by the Court. I close by reviewing 
 
7 Jeffrey J. Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The 
Sources and Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 675, 684–85 (1994). 
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the strategy of consensus-building on the Roberts Court. 
PUBLIC RESPONSES TO UNANIMITY AND LARGE MAJORITY 
COALITIONS ON THE COURT 
How might consensual outcomes foster support for Supreme 
Court rulings? Drawing on research in public opinion, including that 
specifically focused on knowledge of the judiciary, I explore three 
potential pathways through which consensus may influence support. I 
ultimately suggest that the most likely path of influence is shaped by 
the media because citizens learn most of what they know about the 
Court from the press. 
First, when the public is attentive to the Court, consensus may 
provide a credible indication that a policy is non-controversial and 
worthy of support. Research on opinion formation and persuasion 
demonstrates that heuristic processing occurs regularly.8 This enables 
a wide range of cues—or simple pieces of information—to “influence 
opinions without systematic processing of substantive issue-relevant 
arguments.”9 High credibility cues, including those directly related to 
the judiciary, have been shown to exert such an influence.10 
Therefore, one route for the Court to persuade a skeptical public is to 
send the high credibility indication of unanimity when it rules. The 
attentive public may use this information to make a fast and frugal 
judgment that the policy announced by the Court is worthy of 
support. A heuristic processing perspective also implies that the 
specific arguments offered by the Court are of limited relevance to 
 
8 See Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information 
Processing and the Use of  
Sources Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSON. & SOC. 
PSYCH. 752, 753 (1980); see generally RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. 
CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL 
ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (Springer-Verlag 1986). 
9 Brandon L. Bartels & Diana C. Mutz, Explaining Processes of 
Institutional Opinion Leadership, 71 J. POL. 249, 250 (2009). 
10 Baird & Gangl, supra note 6; Zink et al., supra note 6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/21
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persuading the public. 
A second (and competing) perspective is that an attentive public 
engages in effortful, systematic processing of the arguments made by 
the Court. Mindful processing of arguments may make unanimous 
decisions particularly persuasive. When there are no dissents, those 
who read Court opinions to formulate their attitudes will not be 
exposed to counterarguments, making acceptance and support more 
likely.11 This is consistent with research on opinion formation, which 
emphasizes that “top of the head considerations” and the flow of 
political information shape popular attitudes.12 
But there’s a problem with this story. Research strongly suggests 
that the public is only modestly and conditionally attentive to the 
Court and so citizens are unlikely to be direct consumers of 
information from the institution.13 They are more accurately 
characterized as intermittently attentive to the Court, with a few high 
profile rulings—those covered extensively by the press—attracting 
the most notice.14  Which brings me to the third pathway: Because the 
vast majority of information that the public receives about the Court 
comes from the press, the way the press treats consensus has an 
 
11 Bartels and Mutz, supra note 9 at 255. 
12 JOHN R. ZALLER THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 47–51 
(Cambridge University Press 1992). 
13 Gregory A. Caldeira & Kevin T. McGuire, What Americans Know 
about the Courts and Why It Matters, INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY: THE JUDICIARY 262–66 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire 
ed., 2005); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme 
Court? A Reconsideration of Public Ignorance of the High Court, 71 J. POL. 
429–41 (2009); James L. Gibson, Miguel M. Pereira, & Jeffrey Zeigler, 
Updating Supreme Court Legitimacy: Testing the ‘Rule, Learn, Accept’ 
Model of Political Communication, 20 (working paper), 
https://sites.wustl.edu/jeffziegler/files/2016/02/Text-74-Updating-
1543z6h.pdf; Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public 
Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 34 
(2001). 
14 See Gibson et al., supra note 14.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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important effect on how the public responds. Furthermore, the press 
has incentive to be attentive to the degree of consensus on the Court 
when shaping its coverage. Because the media must balance a range 
of objectives when it reports on the Court, it relies heavily on 
information supplied by the justices themselves. Divisive rulings 
indicate the presence of legal and perhaps political controversy and 
supply multiple perspectives from the Justices, which the press has an 
incentive to highlight given its desire to emphasize conflict. In 
contrast, unanimity signals to the press strong agreement in the legal 
community about a dispute.15 
There is thus reason to expect that consensual rulings provide a 
signal to the media that incentivizes positive coverage of rulings. The 
press becomes more likely to defer to the decisions of the Court by 
emphasizing the majority’s perspective at the expense of 
counterarguments when signaled to do so by consensus. Furthermore, 
because the public formulates opinions about the Court largely on the 
basis of media coverage, systematic differences in coverage of 
unanimous versus non-unanimous decisions have consequences for 
public reactions. Simply put, given the coverage to which the public 
is exposed, citizens are more likely to express support for unanimous 
rulings than non-unanimous decisions—a benefit of the Court’s 
recent push for consensus.  
COVERAGE OF CONSENSUAL DECISIONS 
To test the proposition that consensus fosters favorable coverage 
of rulings, I gathered all published coverage of a random sample of 
high salience Supreme Court decisions between the years 1981 and 
2007. Although this time period covers only the early terms of the 
Roberts Court, it covers three Chief Justices’ tenures and the 
controversies over the Bork nomination and Bush v. Gore. The period 
 
15 MICHAEL A. ZILIS, THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMACY: DISSENTING 
OPINIONS, MEDIA COVERAGE, AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS 25–35 (University of Michigan Press 2015). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/21
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also includes years in which public confidence in the Court began to 
decline, giving insight into the dynamics in the decades leading up to 
Roberts’s nomination. Finally, I focus here on three of the leading 
sources of information about the institution, the New York Times, 
Washington Post, and Washington Times. But the trends I capture 
would be the same if I had included the three major cable news 
organizations.16 
To measure favorable coverage for rulings, I rely on two metrics. 
First, I asked two human raters to read and score news articles on (1) 
the basis of their support for the majority opinion and (2) their 
coverage of arguments made by the members of the majority 
coalition versus dissenters. This allowed me to create a metric of 
Decision support for each article, which I then aggregated to the case 
level. Additionally, I drew on the plagiarism software Wcopyfind to 
measure Deference to the Court in news coverage.17 This measure 
evaluates the proportion of coverage that drew directly on language 
from the Court’s majority opinion (as opposed to any other source). 
 Figure 1(a) shows the degree of supportive and deferential 
coverage for highly salient unanimous versus non-unanimous 
decisions of the Court, verifying that more favorable coverage 
accrues to consensual decisions. For instance, direct quotations from 
majority opinions make up about 4.4% of all coverage of non-
unanimous rulings; that percentage increases to 6.6% for unanimous 
rulings. This is a small but meaningful difference in the depiction of a 
ruling that the public receives because these direct quotations also 
correlate with other language that reflects positively on a ruling. This 
can be seen more clearly in the Decision support metric, which 
demonstrates that approximately 63% of coverage of non-unanimous 
rulings was favorable, while approximately 78% of coverage was 
 
 16 For an analysis of cable news coverage, see Zilis, supra note 16, at 
108–10. 
17 See Louis Bloomfield, Wcopyfind, PLAGIARISM RES. SITE (2012), 
http://plagiarism.bloomfieldmedia.com/wordpress/. 
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favorable for unanimous decisions. Additionally, Figure 1(b) depicts 
favorable coverage as the Court’s degree of consensus (measured by 
the absolute size of the majority coalition) varies, suggesting a strong 
correspondence between the degree of consensus and positive 
coverage. As a general rule, the more Justices who join a majority 
coalition, the more favorable the coverage—with unanimous 
decisions receiving the most positive reports of all.  
Figure 1. Supreme Court Consensus Increases Favorable 
Coverage of Rulings 
(a)      (b) 
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Panel (a) shows the raw proportion of favorable media coverage, 
using the Decision support and Deference to the Court measures, for 
unanimous versus non-unanimous rulings. Panel (b) shows the raw 
proportion of favorable media coverage by size of majority coalition. 
Panel (c) shows the predicted amount of supportive coverage after 
controlling for case characteristics. 
To assess this relationship more rigorously, Figure 1(c) depicts the 
predicted amount of supportive coverage as a function of consensus 
after controlling for a series of relevant case characteristics. In other 
words, this figure demonstrates the degree of favorable newspaper 
coverage that we could expect for otherwise similar cases as the size 
of the majority coalition varies.18 Press coverage of unanimous 
decisions is the most positive of all. For example, in otherwise 
similar cases, unanimous decisions are expected to receive positive 
coverage 79% of the time, and quotations from those opinions make 
 
 18 I use a regression analysis that controls for the following factors: the 
ideological diversity of the Court’s majority coalition, the ideological 
conflict between the majority and the president and Congress, the 
ideological distance between the Court and the president and Congress, the 
presence of divided government, the degree of issue controversy and interest 
group participation in a case, the characteristics of the decision itself, and 
the volume of coverage afforded a ruling. See Zilis, supra note 16, at 78–95. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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up about 8% of newspaper stories (estimates not shown). The 
comparable figures for five-four rulings are 58% and 3%, 
respectively.   
To make sense of these patterns, consider that the average high 
salience ruling generates about 5600 words of coverage in the print 
media. This implies that careful readers are exposed to approximately 
448 words directly from majority opinions when a decision is 
unanimous, but only 168 when four justices dissent. The 
overwhelming impression given to citizens following divisive rulings 
is one that minimizes the perspective of the Court majority. 
In sum, the media follows a model of reporting that rewards 
rulings with favorable coverage as the majority brings more members 
into the fold. This is particularly valuable to any institution concerned 
with increasing public support for its decisions but perhaps especially 
the Supreme Court.  
THE CONSEQUENCES OF COVERAGE 
Having established that internal voting dynamics on the bench 
shape media coverage of the Court, it is important to consider 
whether this affects the institution’s ability to legitimate its rulings. 
Put differently, does the Chief Justice’s drive for consensus influence 
the proportion of decisions that are likely to receive public support? 
Answering this question requires a focus on the effects of favorable 
media coverage. 
Experimental evidence is particularly appropriate for this inquiry. 
By manipulating the nature of coverage to which citizens are 
exposed, we can get a better sense of whether changes in the media’s 
depiction of a case cause citizens to adjust their support for the 
Court’s decision, especially when it touches controversial issues. In 
my book, I present several experiments aimed at determining whether 
favorable coverage increases support for rulings.19 I focus on one of 
these studies here. The goal behind the study is to see whether even a 
 
19 ZILIS, supra note 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/21
Document7  12/22/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Political Consequences of Supreme Court Consensus 239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
very modest adjustment in the tone of coverage can reshape support 
for a ruling on a controversial issue. To do so, I focus on the case of 
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, which concerned both the 
Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.20 
In the study, subjects were recruited through an online 
marketplace and randomly assigned to read one of two versions of 
news articles about Rosenberger, modeled on actual media coverage 
(a third group, the control condition, read an unrelated story). The 
two versions of the Rosenberger story included slight but important 
differences in wording, describing the decision as either “praised” by 
supporters or “criticized” by opponents. Other than these differences, 
the descriptions of the ruling were identical. After reading the article, 
subjects answered a series of questions about their approval for the 
ruling.21  
Their responses were revealing. Subjects in the praise condition 
expressed significantly more support for the ruling than those in the 
criticism condition. They were more likely to favor the pro-speech 
position taken by the Court, agree with the ruling, and believe that the 
Justices interpreted the Constitution correctly. I should note that these 
patterns were not issue-specific; I was able to replicate the results in 
experiments on the Second Amendment, congressional term limits, 
government takings of private property, and religious expression.22 
Interestingly, legitimacy appears to play a central role in how 
media coverage shapes popular reactions to rulings. Legitimacy, a 
form of durable loyalty enjoyed by the judiciary, enables the 
institution to limit the negative consequences of unpopular decisions, 
 
20 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). The dispute 
originated from the University of Virginia’s refusal to cover the costs of 
printing for a student-run religious magazine. Because the university 
covered these costs for non-religious publications, the Supreme Court ruled 
that its refusal violated vital free speech principles. Id. 
21 ZILIS, supra note 15, at 129–42. 
22 ZILIS, supra note 15, at 129–42. 
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such as noncompliance or politicized attacks on the judiciary.23 When 
it comes to how citizens respond to media presentations of 
controversial rulings, the experimental results show that legitimacy is 
critical. Figure 2 depicts the influence of legitimacy on support for 
the Rosenberger decision across experimental conditions.24 As this 
figure demonstrates, legitimacy directly shapes support for rulings 
when subjects read favorable depictions, but has no effect when 
subjects read unflattering coverage. Put differently, subjects who 
assigned the Court a high level of legitimacy were more likely to 
support the decision when exposed to favorable press coverage, but 
no more likely to do so in the criticism condition. This result suggests 
that legitimacy is a weak persuasive currency for the Court: it only 
enables the Justices to increase support for rulings when the media 
treats them favorably. 
 
Figure 2. Legitimacy Buttresses Support for Rosenberger, 
Conditional on Favorable Coverage 
 
23 David Easton, A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support, 
5(4) BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 435,444–46 (1975); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. 
Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 
92(2) AM. POL. SCI. REV., 343–58 (1998); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. 
Caldeira & Lester K. Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies They 
Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58(2) 
POL. RES. Q., 187–201 (2005). 
 24 The figure presents the marginal discrete effect of legitimacy on 
decision support, by experimental condition, after controlling for a subject’s 
religious affiliation, religiosity, conservatism, age, and gender. See ZILIS, 
supra note 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/21
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In short, experimental evidence demonstrates that media coverage 
has clear consequences for how the public responds to Court rulings. 
In a favorable-coverage environment, citizens rely on their pre-
existing loyalty towards the Court as a lens through which to assess 
decisions. Because this support is often robust, positive media 
coverage consistently generates public support for rulings.25 In 
contrast, unfavorable coverage, which is much more likely to come 
about following divided decisions, severs the legitimacy-support link, 
which limits popular support for rulings. 
CONSENSUS-BUILDING AS A PUBLIC-FACING STRATEGY 
Chief Justice Roberts has made no secret of his desire for a 
collegial, consensual Court. Though his reasons are likely many in 
number, he may well understand that consensus—and unanimity, in 
particular—buttresses public support for his Court’s decisions, 
including potentially controversial ones. A primary reason is that the 
media is attentive to and influenced by signals of controversy (or the 
 
25 James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Legitimacy Grounded in Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59(1) 
AM. J. POL. SCI., 162–74 (2015). 
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lack thereof) from the High Court, such that unanimity or large 
majority coalitions blunt the press’s willingness to portray rulings in 
a negative light. With consensus, the Court majority is far better 
poised to control the framing battle over its decisions and much more 
likely to generate support for its decisions. 
The Roberts Court’s thinking on the importance of consensus may 
well have been informed by recent controversies. I think here of the 
2005 decision, Kelo v. City of New London,26 which generated 
substantial public backlash, including attacks aimed at the Court and 
sensational attempts to embarrass the Justices—even though the case 
concerned a constitutional clause, the Public Use Clause, that seldom 
generated popular controversy.27 Press coverage zeroed in on the 
dissenters’ arguments to paint a portrait of private property under 
siege by the Court.28 Interestingly, Kelo followed on the heels of 
another eminent domain ruling, Lingle v. Chevron.29 Despite the view 
among some legal scholars that Lingle substantially broadened the 
scope of the government’s eminent domain authority, the Court was 
able to stave off press criticism of the ruling and it passed with little 
public notice.30 Unanimity in Lingle helped to forestall the 
 
 26   Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
 27 Janice Nadler, Shari S. Diamond & Matthew M. Patton, Government 
Takings of Private Property, PUB. OP. & CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, 
286–309 (Oxford University Press 2008).  
 28  Id. One of the most commonly referenced phrases in coverage of 
Kelo was Justice O’Connor’s contention that “all private property is now 
vulnerable.” ZILIS, supra note 15, at 75. 
 29 Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 30 Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Taking Muddle: 
Kelo, Lingle, and Public Discourse about Private Property, 34(2) FORHAM 
URB. L. J., 613–55 (2006); D. Benjamin. Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The 
Potential Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of 
Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69(1) ALB. L. REV., 343–56 (2006); 
but see Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. City of New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 
and Bad Judgment, 38(2) URB. LAWYER 201–35 (2006). See also ZILIS, 
supra note 15 at 74–76. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/21
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controversy that followed Kelo. 
 Going forward, the Roberts Court faces countervailing tides. 
Even as the Justices have placed a renewed emphasis on unanimity, 
potentially buttressing support for some rulings, popular confidence 
in the Supreme Court is showing signs of decline.31 Since 
institutional loyalty functions as a source of support for rulings that 
receive favorable coverage, the Justices may find it more difficult to 
gain approval for even consensual decisions. Furthermore, even 
Roberts himself has acknowledged that consensus is far from the 
Court’s only goal. In his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, Roberts 
noted that respect for the institution “flows from the perception—and 
reality—that we exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases.”32 
As perhaps the Court’s most vocal advocate of consensus, Roberts’s 
willingness to dissent and nod to concerns about the institution’s 
legitimacy speak to the limitations of the consensus-building strategy. 
Nonetheless, because the press is carefully attuned for signals of 
conflict on the bench, with considerable consequence for the public’s 
subsequent response, Roberts’s strategy offers one path for the 
modern institution to potentially buttress support for its decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 Gibson & Nelson, supra note 4. 
 32 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2624 (2015). 
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